COMPULSION ELEMENT IN A DEFENCE OF NECESSITY
v Perka (1984) 14 CCC (3d) 385,  2 SCR 233
v Salaca  NZLR 421
Adams on Criminal Law 2nd Student Ed (Robertson Ed)
[I]f a man be desperately assaulted, and in peril of death, and cannot
otherwise escape, unless to satisfy his assailant's fury he will kill
an innocent person then present, the fear and actual force will not
acquit him of the crime and punishment of murder, if he commit the fact;
for he ought rather to die himself, than kill an innocent ...
It is my intention within this thesis to examine the development of the defence of necessity at common law; principally in Great Britain, and with some illustrative international decisions. I also intend to describe New Zealand's particular treatment of the defence, with its partial incorporation into statute. Following that is a critique of our approach; and suggestions as to how, in the absence of statutory reform or judicial expansion, the defence could be brought more in line with the common law.
1. A MATTER OF DEFINITION
Necessity has been variously defined over the years, and is known to be comprised of 'species', or aspects. These have often been separated by the Courts, by the jurists, and by statute. These separations are often conflicting, and may come under different names. By way of an introduction I would like to set out how I will describe the area of law called "necessity".
then, broadly covers the area of justification or excuse where a person
seeks to exculpate their actions on the grounds of avoiding a greater
evil. It is similar to, but distinct from self-defence, impossibility
[I]n every law there are some things which when they happen may break the words of the law, and yet not break the law itself; and such things are exempted out of the penalty of the law ... although they are done against the letter of it ... the words of them are broken to avoid greater inconveniences, or through necessity, or by compulsion ...
necessitous situation may occur when a person is forced to act by external
circumstances, either naturally occurring, or through the actions of
a human agent. The English Court of Appeal in R v Conway described the
former as necessity, or "duress of circumstances" (the first
use of that phrase), and the latter as duress. Lord Hailsham in R v
Howe claimed this to be an unnecessary distinction. While I agree that
the Court of Appeal is unclear in its use of language, the separation
of necessity into its component parts for the purpose of definition
is a useful guide, and this approach has been taken in New Zealand law.
is either a) "Duress by circumstances", or
2. COMMON LAW
a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against
the Law, he is totally excused; because no Law can oblige a man to abandon
his own preservation ... Nature therefore compells him to the fact.
2.1 EARLY HISTORY
the 16th Century, the only relevant authorities on necessity are cited
by Hale , from the years 1320, 1347 and 1419. They are cases where treasonable
acts were pardoned by virtue of the defendants being under duress by
rebels, or invading enemies. Already, from such an early period, the
concept of the defence has been confirmed in English law.
The law of cases of necessity is not likely to be well furnished with precise rules; necessity creates the law; it supersedes rules; and whatever is reasonable and just in such cases, is likewise legal. It is not to be considered a matter of surprise, therefore, if much instituted rule is not to be found on such subjects.
Glanville Williams commented on this case, that the "peculiarity
of necessity as a doctrine of law is the difficulty or impossibility
of formulating it with any approach to precision ... It is in reality
a dispensing power in the judges where they are brought to feel that
obedience to the law would have endangered some higher value" .
[W]hen by force of circumstances a man has the duty cast upon him of
taking some action for
the most famous historical case to deal with necessity in England is,
of course, R v Dudley and Stephens ; and its facts are just the sort
to test the limits as to how far the Courts will entertain the defence.
Three men and a minor had taken to an open boat when their yacht, The
Mignonette, had floundered in a severe storm. They subsisted on what
few supplies they had taken with them, and on what they could catch;
until, after 20 days, Dudley and Stephens killed the boy for food. They
were rescued four days later.
The Court accepted that a killing in self-defence is justifiable, but are adamant that killing someone who does not pose a threat clearly constitutes murder:
[T]he deliberate killing of this unoffending and unresisting boy was clearly murder, unless the killing can be justified by some well-recognised excuse admitted by the law ... the temptation to the act which existed here is not what the law has ever called necessity ...
idea of allowing an act of necessity to be a defence for murder was
a proposition which appeared to be "at once dangerous, immoral,
and opposed to all legal principle and analogy". Instead, Lord
Coleridge enunciated the principle that "while to preserve one's
life is generally speaking a duty ... it may be the plainest and highest
duty to sacrifice it".
in Dudley and Stephens the Court cited an American case, United States
v Holmes . In that case an iceberg had forced a number of people to
sea in a rowboat, including the captain and various other crew members,
while the remaining passengers drowned. However, because of a leak,
the boat started taking in water, and after a few days was threatened
with being overswamped. At this stage the crew threw sixteen passengers
The defendant in R v Bourne was charged with unlawfully procuring the abortion of a 15 year old rape victim. He was a doctor in a top hospital, and performed the operation in 'good faith', to preserve the life of the mother. Macnaghtan J's address to the jury suggested that that a "reasonable view" of the circumstances should be taken, and that :
[T]he law is not that the doctor has ... to wait until the unfortunate woman is in peril of immediate death and then at the last moment snatch her from the jaws of death. He is not only entitled, but it is his duty, to perform the operation with a view to saving her life.
Consequently the jury found the doctor's actions to be justified. Especially worth noting is the fact that his actions would have been excused even when the threat of death was not imminent or certain, but, at best, "reasonably certain".
Finally, a useful Australian authority, R v Hurley & Murray considers the principles governing duress. The accused and his de facto were compelled by threats to aid escaped criminals, and dispose of two corpses. When the accused was away from the men his de facto was effectively held hostage, such that the threats to her "would have been operative during the entire period of his absence" and "his only concern must have been for the safety of the woman" . The extent to which threats may negative intent ought to be the subject of a direction to the jury :
[I]n considering whether the necessary desire had been established they should have regard to all the evidence as to threats and fears, whether or not they considered that it matched up to the requirements [required by] duress.
Further the circumstances in which his de facto was held hostage "would support a view that the threat against her was of a death sufficiently 'imminent' and 'immediate'" to compel the accused's actions, even when the threat was not present to or directed upon himself.
2.2 RECENT HISTORY
R v Hudson & Taylor duress was pleaded as a defence to perjury,
where the person making the threats had been present in the Court room
at the time the crime was committed. The Court made a generous allowance
for the circumstances, in that :
This is possibly too wide, and later statements by Lord Parker CJ make
us consider the correctness of the decision. He describes the defence
as operating "if the will of the accused has been overborne by
threats of death or serious personal injury so that the commission of
the alleged offence was no longer the voluntary act of the accused".
This is uncomfortably close to the concept of compulsion as "normative
involuntariness" rejected in 1.
I suggested to both counsel that the driver might be excused in crossing
the lights to save [a] man.
This statement is somewhat inconclusive; while a defence of necessity is denied, the idea that the circumstances may mitigate the sentence reappears. However, Lord Denning makes further statements against necessity in London Borough of Southwark v Williams :
[I]f hunger were once allowed to be an excuse for stealing, it would
open a way through which all
Obviously what is being stated here is a policy decision for disallowing
the defence, i.e. the 'floodgates' fear. While this might have seemed
like a death knell for a defence of necessity at common law, Edmund
Davies LJ made a statement in the same case to the effect that nonetheless
a defendant may avail himself of the defence if there was "an urgent
situation of imminent peril". There are also more favourable cases
for the defence.
constable in purported exercise of his power to control traffic on a
public road the right under
This is a validation of the defence, while "the extent that it exists must depend on the degree of emergency or the alternative danger to be averted" . The scope of the defence was also considered in R v Loughnan , an Australian authority which dealt with a gaol escape. As well as laying down the usual requirements of necessity, the Court found that fleeing a fire was justification for the crime in question. Consequently, necessity was confirmed in Victoria.
Next in chronology is an important Canadian case, Perka v The Queen , which provides a clear summary of necessity at common law. The Court's initial summary of the defence is as follows:
As an excuse, necessity rests on a realistic assessment of human weakness,
recognizing that a liberal
Here the Canadian Court demonstrates a positive empathy for the defence, citing 'altruism' as one of the motives by which one might be compelled to transgress. The necessary limitations are then examined :
The defence must, however, be strictly controlled and scrupulously limited to situations that correspond to its underlying rationale. That rationale is that it is inappropriate to punish acts which are normatively involuntary.
The Court lays out its tests for "determining whether the wrongful
act was truly the only realistic reaction open". These include
to England's spate of driving offences, R v Willer dealt with a defendant
who had driven on the footpath to avoid a gang. The Court of Appeal
held that necessity did not arise, as they were duressed to avoid harm,
not to commit any act. This distinction seems incorrect because the
defendant's actions would have been the same whether it was a group
of threatening humans, or (for example) a group of threatening bulls,
that forced him onto the pavement.
Whether 'duress of circumstances' is called 'duress' or 'necessity' does not matter. What is important is that, whatever it is called, it is subject to the same limitations as the 'do this or else' species of duress.
other words, the requirements placed on a defence of necessity will
be the same, no matter what particular 'species' of necessity is pleaded.
This codification is very similar to the rules laid out in Perka, and
is rendered ever more certain in R v Martin .
Most commonly this defence arises as duress, that is pressure on the accused's will from the wrongful threats or violence of another. Equally however it can arise from other objective dangers threatening the accused or others ...
The House of Lords in R v Gotts held 3 to 2 that because necessity wasn't available to murder, nor should it be available as a defence to attempted murder. Lord Lowry delivered a strong dissent, arguing the conceptual differences between murder and attempted murder, especially under duress; but Lord Jauncy likewise made compelling statements of policy to support the majority decision :
The reason why duress has for so long been stated not to be available as a defence to a murder charge is that the law regards the sanctity of human life and the protection thereof as of paramount importance ... I can therefore see no justification in logic, morality or law in affording to an attempted murderer the defence which is withheld from a murderer.
Since the determinative decision in R v Martin, the other most important
English authority has been R v Pommell . Here the appellant was charged
with possession of an illegal firearm, a sub-machine gun, which he claimed
to have taken from another person in order to hand it to the police.
There was a deliberation as to how long he had been in possession, which
ultimately lost him the case at trial level. He appealed successfully,
and the Judge emphasised the need to act promptly in such a case. Acting
otherwise would be imprudent, and may very well annull the defence.
is regrettable that much of the early debate in New Zealand concerning
the merits of the necessity defence was highly rhetorical and tended
to falter upon the perception that early examples of necessity ... simply
existed for the whimsical amusement of 'casuists' who have 'for centuries'
amused themselves with such teasers.
3.1 STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Necessity has not had an illustrious history in this country; and although noted Australasian law reformer Sir Samuel Griffith intended to incorporate the concept into his Criminal Code on the grounds that the "morally innocent" should be protected from prosecution when acting under "sudden or extraordinary emergency", the defence has been largely confronted with "disinterested scholarism".
S23 of the draft criminal Code recommended by the 1879 Royal Commission (Cmd C-2345) read as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this section, a person who commits an offence under compulsion by threats of immediate death or grievous bodily harm from a person who is present when the offence is committed is protected from criminal responsibility if he believes that the threats will be carried out and if he is not a party to any association or conspiracy whereby he is subject to compulsion.
Instrumental duress by human agent is provided for in the statutory defence of "compulsion" from s24 of the Crimes Act 1961 :
Compulsion - (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person
who commits an offence under compulsion by threats of immediate death
or grievous bodily harm from a person who is present when the offence
is committed is protected from criminal responsibility if he believes
that the threats will be carried out and if he is not a party to any
association or conspiracy whereby he is subject to compulsion.
and Brookbanks refer to the various analogous references in the Crimes
Act, including s48 self defence and defence of another; s52-6 defence
of property; s61 and s61A regarding surgical operations (where one is
protected from criminal liability for performing any 'reasonable', i.e.
necessary, operations); and ss183 and 187A regarding the procuring of
an abortion (whereby the act is unlawful unless "necessary"
under subsection(3)). They also mention s3(2) of the Trespass Act 1980,
which provides a defence against a charge of trespass on the grounds
that such an action was "necessary ... for [one's] own protection
or the protection of some other person".
3.2 CASE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand case law on necessity has had a tendency to be unfocused,
and non-committal. While the s24 compulsion species of necessity has
been clearly and often defined by judges, and typically restricted to
its specific wording, the other aspects of necessith have remained vague.
The following is a chronological account of the entire species of necessity,
with relevant clarifications given in 3.3.
It was necessary for the Crown to ... satisfy the jury that the very nature of the association was such that the offender, as a reasonable man, should have been able to foresee that the association was of a kind which at least rendered in possible that at a later stage he might be made subject to compulsion.
the accused had protested the use of a firearm, the defence should have
S20. General rule as to justifications - (1) All rules and principles of the common law which render any circumstances a justification or excuse for any act or omission, or a defence to any charge, shall remain in force and apply in respect of a charge of any offence ... except so far as they are altered by or inconsistent with this Act or any other enactment.
came before the Court of Appeal again in 1981 in R v Teichelman where
a man was charged for supplying drugs to an undercover police officer.
He claimed that he had been compelled to make the sale by one O'Keefe,
and gave evidence testifying to a long chain of threats made directly
to himself, and more which he overheard made to others. O'Keefe had
also "brought around a shotgun which made him feel nervous",
and the Constable, himself a big man, had "[shown] him a handgun
which made him feel scared, and ... kept on pressing him to supply drugs".
While based on common law principles, s24 clearly and precisely limits the availability of a defence of duress to a criminal charge. The legislation provides a narrow release from criminal responsibility where its strict requirements are met ... It is that belief in the inevitability of immediate and violent retribution for failure on his part to comply with the threatening demand which provides the justification for exculpation from criminal responsibility. The subsection is directed essentially at what are colloquially called standover situations where the accused fears that instant death or grievous bodily harm will ensue if he does not do what he is told.
menacing conduct fell "far short of acting under the continuing
Concepts such as impossibility, inevitability, necessity, involuntariness, reasonable mistake of fact, the act of a stranger, and absence of negligence are different routes to that social goal of excluding liability for conduct which is considered non-culpable ...
In an unreported Court of Appeal decision, R v Perrot , it was re-confirmed that compulsion can only be claimed in relation to the time when the act in question was committed. The defence was again raised against drug dealing charges in R v Frickleton , where a regular heroin user had been 'hassled' into giving some of her drugs to an acquaintance. The Court held that the fact that she had been motivated to supply heroin by pressure exerted by a third party did not affect her intent to supply . McMullin J stated :
The mens rea which the Crown was obliged to prove was an intention to do an act which was made unlawful by the statute, namely to supply heroin ... In that situation it is sufficient to say that once it is shown that an accused person intended to do the act which is forbidden by law mere apprehension is not enough to provide a defence. Once there is a conscious choice to take a step, that it is enough to prove the necessary mens rea for the offence of supply.
The judge also warned that this statement was not meant to be "any
pronouncement on the metes and bounds of the defence of compulsion under
s24". It is unclear how seriously we can take this caveat; evidence
was given during the trial that when the accused refused to supply she
was strangled and pushed against the walls. If it was decided that these
threats went only to her motive, did that not remove the application
If duress were said to negative will it would negative an act, which by definition requires will; if it negatived the existence of an act it would negative crime ... In truth the extent of duress as a defence in crime cannot be settled by a series of definitions, and we do better to regard it as standing altogether outside the definition of will and act.
In other words, s24 shouldn't affect the existence of mens rea - the
person is not acting involuntarily.
an objective test is not open in New Zealand where the wording of s24
specifically refers to the belief of the accused thereby requiring a
subjective test [,] nevertheless a question of fact does arise whether
such belief is genuinely held which the prosecution must negate beyond
reasonable doubt. Whether such a belief was reasonable or well grounded
would be relevant to the issue whether it was genuinely held.
extremely important case in the law's development is Kapi v MOT. The
facts involved a man who hit a parked car while driving home, but failed
to stop because he was scared of being given a 'hiding' by the owner
of the vehicle . He pleaded duress of circumstances in his defence,
which was accepted but ultimately he was convicted because he failed
to satisfy that defence.
[The Court] was not referred to any New Zealand cases in which the defence has been expressly found to be available. There are, however, English cases recognising the defence and providing assistance as to its scope and they will be referred to. On the basis of these it cannot now be said that the defence of necessity, at least in form of duress of circumstances, does not exist in the criminal law of England.
Essentially it was found that duress of circumstances would be acceptable
in New Zealand, but would be construed along even tighter limits than
compulsion (at least in that the belief had to be reasonably held).
[S]24 provides a defence of compulsion (or duress) where the criminal act is done under threat of death or grievous bodily harm from a person who is present when the offence is committed ... [W]e do not consider s20 can be said to preserve a common law defence of duress by threat or fear of death or grievous bodily harm from a person not present.
The damage is made worse, because without specifying exactly which areas of necessity they mean, the Court explains that :
Having regard to the limits upon the defence now identified in the more recent English cases it must be seen as probable that in New Zealand the scope of the defence was considered by the Legislature and that s24 Crimes Act reflects the extent to which it was adopted in this country.
This statement is not incorrect if we mean instrumental duress by a
human agent, because that is compulsion, and it is narrowly defined
in s24; but the English cases in question (especially R v Conway, as
previously discussed) dealt with non-instrumental duress by a human
agent. So despite commending the English cases, the Court immediately
excludes them: "So far as such fact situations would not fall within
s24 this might be said to result from deliberate legislative intent
to restrict the scope of the defence of duress or compulsion".
[I]f there is to be such a development in the criminal law which New Zealand has codified that should be undertaken by Legislature ... [and] there are to be bounre in mind the often expressed reservations as to the desirability of judicially expanding the defence of necessity.
Just how the Legislature should approach the problems with the defence
is an issue I will examine in 4.2, shortly. But first, I shall raise
two post-Kapi cases to illustrate the present state of the law in New
And previously :
[I]t is quite clear that there were substantial periods during which [the person making the threats] was not present and [the accused] had opportunities to seek assistance and secure medical care for her child and otherwise bring an end to her ill-treatment. While those periods continued she failed in her duty. Her situation was no different from that of a person who has an opportunity to escape and avoid committing acts under threat of death or serious injury.
I doubt that this really takes account of battered woman's syndrome,
in which the woman finds herself unable to leave the dangerous relationship,
but undoubtedly the grotesque facts of the case made it hard for the
Court to presently entertain the defence. They did however note that
s24, when available, "cover[s] commission of offences either as
principle or party".
The extent of the common law defence of necessity has not been determined by the Courts in this country. What is clear is that the defence has, at least in part, received statutory recognition ... It is accepted that the defence is not available on the facts of this case because the only person present at the time the offence was committed was [her partner] and it is not suggested ... that she was in any further danger from him.
He added that there was also "a defence of necessity or duress of circumstances where those circumstances are other than threats from persons", arising in English common law, that was now available in New Zealand but "subject to the same limitations as the 'do this or else' species of duress" :
[I]t is a reasonable conclusion to be drawn from Kapi and the subsequent decision of R v Lamont ... that the defence of necessity of circumstances is available in New Zealand, but only where the perceived threat is one of imminent death or serious injury to the defendant or some other person. An example might be the disqualified driver whose wife has a heart attack in a location where there is no telephone and no person to provide assistance, and in reasonable fear of her imminent death, drives her to the nearest hospital.
What should be upsetting to any student of the law is the fact that the Courts' interpretation of s24 denies any person in the same situation, where the heart attack is triggered by another person (for example, by assault), of a defence. There can be no rational basis for this distinction; it is the Courts' unwillingness to make a wider or purposive reading of s24, which is itself simply the result of poor draughtsmanship.
3.3 CONCLUSIONS FROM NEW ZEALAND CASE LAW
All case law points to the fact that s24 is to be interpreted strictly; duress involving threats from persons must exactly satisfy the requirements of the statute, and as a result, non-instrumental duress by human agent falls outside the ambit of our law.
From Police v Kawiti the following conclusions are made about duress of circumstances:
1. The defence of duress of circumstances is available where the duress
is not that of persons.
Kawiti and the Law Commission both cite the same passage from Simester and Brookbanks which lists what these requirements might otherwise be :
appears, then, that by synthesising the New Zealand case law on necessity
with such English case law as is consistent, the following observations,
at least, may be made about the operation of the defence of necessity
in New Zealand:
4. DISSATISFACTION WITH s24
is just possible to imagine cases in which the expediency of breaking
the law is so overwhelmingly great that people may be justified in breaking
it, but these cases cannot be defined beforehand.
4.1 ROOM TO MOVE AT COMMON LAW?
much of the general defence of "necessity" survives in New
Zealand law is a question that has never been definitively answered.
However, the previous section hopefully illustrates the likely scenario.
[A] lynch mob poses a threat to the intended victim, not because it wishes to compel the victim to commit a crime but because it desires to kill the victim. Under current law, the victim would apparently have no defence if he or she committed an offence to escape from a non-instrumental threat posed by humans (such as a lynch mob).
That such a threat is required was confirmed both Teichelman and Raroa;
and again from the Law Commission that "the manner in which section
24 has been interpreted in Kapi and Kawiti would exclude the defence
of necessity, as the danger is posed by a person" . We can see
the unsatisfactory results of this apparent Legislative oversight in
Kawiti itself, and one can easily imagine others.
D is driving his car down a steep hill at night. Suddenly, the large truck which has been travelling at a safe distance behind him appears to speed up and "threatens" to ram him from behind. D recognises that being hit by a truck may cause a serious accident. Unbeknown to D, the driver of the truck has had a heart attack and the truck is, in reality, driverless. As D speeds up to escape from the danger he passes a traffic officer hidden in a lay-by and is ultimately charged with driving a an excessive speed. Should D have a defence of duress of circumstances?
actuality the answer is probably 'yes', since what appeared to D to
be a non-instrumental duress by human agent is in fact an objective
danger, free of human interference. However, lacking any rational justification,
were the driver alive and intentionally pursuing D at a dangerous speed
(as in fact D believed was happened), D would not be able to avail himself
of the defence. This was the situation in R v Lamont .
is possible, reform aside, that this may not be the end of the matter.
It appears that there are judges (albeit at lower Court levels) who
are willing to expand the defence. R v Smith for example allowed the
defence of compulsion to justify a woman's driving while intoxicated
to escape her enraged husband.
4.2 STATUTORY REFORM
There was a legislative reform of the Crimes Act proposed in 1989. The Law Commission observed that :
English courts have recognised [that] necessity and compulsion are each a species of duress [but] the separate codification of compulsion in New Zealand has led to unfortunate divergences in the two defences in this country. Codification of both defences along the same lines would achieve compatibility.
The revision by the Crimes Consultative Committee appeared in the Crimes Bill 1989, and included clause 30 necessity (duress of circumstances), and clause 31 duress (to replace compulsion). The proposed amendments were as follows:
Necessity - (1) A person is not criminally responsible for any act done
or omitted to be done under circumstances of emergency in which -
the quote from Professor Kenny heading this section is correct in assuming
that such cases of necessity "cannot be defined beforehand",
these reform proposals seem to be flexible enough to cater to any sympathetic
occurrences, while preventing undesired reliance upon the defences.
As noted by Glanville Williams , "since the defence of necessity involves a collision of interests and a consequential judgment of value, it is capable of raising problems of great ethical and social difficulty". The case law has demonstrated the truth of this observation; so as a final thought, I would like to conclude with a passage from Lord Hailsham's decision in R v Howe, which looks to the prerogative of mercy as a non-statutory, and non-judicial remedy for these troubling cases :
am not so shocked as some of the judicial opinions have been at the
need ... to invoke the availability of administrative as distinct from
purely judicial remedies for the hardships which might otherwise occur
in the most agonising cases. Even in Dudley v Stephens in 1884 when
the death penalty was mandatory and frequently inflicted, the prerogative
was used to reduce a sentence of death by hanging to one of six months
in prison. In murder cases the available mechanisms are today both more
flexible and more sophisticated ... In the background is always the
prerogative and, it may not be unreasonably be suggested, that is exactly
what the prerogative is for.
(1550) 1 Plowd 2, 75 ER 1.
Ibid, page 18.
 3 All ER 1025,  3 WLR 1238 (CA).
 AC 417,  1 All ER 771 (HL).
P.C. i 49-50, 56-8.
(1609) Hob 96.
(1672) 83 ER 268.
(1746) 18 St. Tr. 391.
(1779) 21 St. Tr. 1222 (KB), (1779) 99 ER 156.
Sir Stephen, Digest of Criminal Law (1st edition, 1877) Art 32.
(1801) 83 ER 268.
Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (1953) 570.
R v Vantandillo (1815) 4 M&S 73, 105 ER 762.
(1872) LR 4 PC 222.
Ibid, at 230.
(1884) 14 QBD 273, [1881-5] All ER Rep 617.
Simester and Brookbanks, Principles of Criminal Law (1998) 356.
Fed. Case No. 15383 (CCED Pa, 1842).
 Vol 3 CCC 615.
Ibid, page 618.
 VR 526.
Ibid, page 530.
Ibid, page 542.
 2 QB 202.
Ibid, page 204.
 Ch 655.
Ibid, at 668.
 2 All ER 175, at 179.
 1 WLR 65, Wien J at 69.
Woods v Richards  RTR 202, per Eveleigh J.
 VR 443.
'Normative involuntariness' as discussed in 1.
(1986) 83 Cr App R 235 (CA).
 1 All ER 652, (1989) 88 Cr App R 343 (CA).
Ibid, pages 653-4.
 2 AC 412.
Ibid, pages 425-6.
 2 Cr App R 607 (CA).
Originally Crimes Act 1908 No 32, s44.
 NZLR 421.
Ibid, page 421.
Ibid, page 422.
 NZLR 1070.
Ibid, page 1076.
Ibid, page 1077.
 2 NZLR 508.
 2 NZLR 65.
Ibid, pages 66-7.
 NZLR 78.
Ibid, page 81.
Unrep 22/4/83, CA120/82.
 2 NZLR 670.
Similar reasoning (motive versus intent) was taken in R v Steane  KB 9997,  1 All ER 813.
Supra 57, pages 671-2.
Criminal Law: The General Part (1953), page 592.
(1987) 2 CRNZ 596.
Ibid, page 605.
Ibid, page 602.
 1 NZLR 521.
He was, after all, in Porirua.
 1 NZLR 227.
Supra 66, page 229.
(1992) 8 CRNZ 49.
Supra 68, page 52.
Ibid, pages 54-5.
Ibid, page 54.
Ibid, page 55.
 2 NZLR 424.
Ibid, page 436.
 1 NZLR 117.
Ibid, page 122.
Battered Defendants, NZLC PP41.
Supra 19, page 377.
Supra 79, page 62.
Unrep 27/4/92, CA442/91.
Ibid, page 10.
 6 WWR 16.
Crimes Bill Consultative Committee, Crimes Bill 1989 (1991) Dept of Justice, page 21.
Supra 60, page 575.
Supra 5, page 433.