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psychology- consciousness studies Myers for the 21st Century Jonathan Edelmann IRREDUCIBLE MIND: Towards a Psychology for the 21.st Century Edward Kelly, Emily Williams Kelly, Adam Crabtree, AlanGauld : Michael Grosso & Bruce Greyson. Lanhan, Maryland: Roman &Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007, 800 pp., $63.96 h/b -ISBN 0742547922.With CD containing F. W. H. Myers' hard-to-find classic two-volume Human Personality (1903) and selected contemporary reviews
Irreducible Mind (IM) is one of the most well researched, copiously annotated and carefully argued attacks on physicalism and epiphenomenalism to date. It is a sophisticated attempt to incorporate parapsychology (or other data often ignored by mainstream science) within a scientific theory of mind, and a must-read for anyone working in consciousness studies, psychology and the history of science.Although a massive collaborative effort by six distinguished authors who work in psychiatry, psychology and philosophy, one could easily mistake it for the work of a single author given its coherence of style and thought, which is rare with edited volumes. The authors share a common dissatisfaction with physicalism, the received academic conception of mind, arguing that a viable alternative does exist and basing their views on those of F. W. H. Myers. They cite research from many areas of psychology. There's a diversity of empirical evidence suggesting that consciousness profoundly influences the physical world, that it may survive death and that aspects of many physical phenomena are manifestations of an underlying mental reality. They argue that 'physicalist theories of mind-brain relations are inadequate in principle' (p. 639) so we need a conception of mind-body able to accommodate all that we know about them. Chapter 1 (Edward Kelly) is an overview of the past few centuries of philosophy of mind, paranormal research and psychology. Kelly brings philosophical subtlety and wide-ranging historical knowledge, making the chapter an important resource for advanced undergraduate and graduate teaching in psychology, philosophy and history of science. But Kelly is not merely reporting history- he engages it, thereby making an interesting story all the more provocative, arguing that reductionism has failed to provide an adequate explanation of consciousness and that non-reductionistic alternatives have been overlooked. A problem with this chapter, however, is that sometimes Kelly argues that computational theories of mind have not told us anything meaningful about consciousness (p. 45), yet he also says that a robust theory of consciousness must take into consideration everything we can learn about it. Surely he cannot be arguing that neuroscience has contributed nothing to our understanding of the 'hard problem' because it has operated (primarily) within a materialist paradigm? Chapter 2 (Emily Kelly) provides an important overview of Myers' thought, which is unfortunately overshadowed by that of William James-a friend and admirer of his-despite Myers's importance in the history of Western thought. It describes the problems associated with a major assumption of contemporary psychology; that the psyche can adequately be approached via the methods of physics. It sets out the philosophical foundations, detailed by Myers' himself, on which the scientific evidence in the rest of the book is built (discussed briefly below). Chapters 3 -8 each refer to
hundreds of studies aimed at showing that mental states do influence the world
in avariety of ways and that minds do survive death ,(and live to tell about
it). Apparently supranormal experiences are also described, raising questions
about the capabilities of mind. The anecdotes and other evidence is critically
discussed, thus avoiding both 'New Age' naivety and the knee-jerk rejection
common in academia. Chapter 3 (Emily Kelly) tells, for example, of psychosomatic
conditions in which a mother believes she is pregnant (but is not) and develops
the symptoms of pregnancy. There is a study of a Yogin who was able to stop his
heart from beating at will for almost five days before returning to a normal
condition (p. 177). These indicate profound levels of mental causation.
Chapter 4 (Alan Gauld) argues
that memory and personal identity need not be rooted in the brain because of,
for instance, near-death experiences and Ian Stevenson's studies on
reincarnation. Gauld also discusses problems with contemporary psychological and
neurological conceptions of memory.
Chapter 5 (Adam Crabtree)
examines reports in which a person automatically sends a message containing
objective information unobtainable through normal means via a supposed
personality from another realm (p. 307). Myers seemed to think this second
personality was not necessarily an independent personality (p. 354), but an
otherwise hidden aspect of the mind.We hear of Leonora Piper of Boston who for
40 years was able to channel personalities, thus providing supranormal knowledge
and embody mannerisms of people unknown to her; Crabtree suggests these reports
(and others) were never falsified.
Chapter 6 (Emily Kelly, Bruce Greyson
and Ed Kelly) examines near-death and out-of-body experiences as well
as sensations gained from the dead. Physicalism clearly cannot accommodate these
accounts, yet it is argued they deserve our attention. They provide a lucid
critique of physicalist explanations.
Chapter 7 (Ed Kelly and Michael
Grosso) treat genius. or 'the spontaneous production of original,
unexpected and unteachable work that wins our admiration' (p. 427). Here they
are not taking on physicalism or epiphenomalism themselves, rather the 'nothing-
special' interpretation of genius, which considers it the result of mere special
effort,
Chapter 8 (Ed Kelly and Grosso)
treats mystical experience, the 'near-relative' of genius. This is not a
theological or comparative project, but a serious appraisal of 'the
psychological character and biological accompaniments of these powerful
experience,' which also tries to find a middle ground between the naive
acceptance of some religious believers and the unthinking reductionism of some
academics (p. 496). The canonical mystical experiences are discussed along with
the various 'sorts of interpretations of them. They recognize the biological
role and impact of mystical experiences, yet critique reductionistic accounts.
They recognize the need of traveling to the Orient to further study mystics
(p.572),
Chapter 9 (Edward Kelly) is the
grandest in scope; it attempt to reconcile the wide range of data on mystical
experiences, genius, apparitions, mediums, etc. in previous chapters with the
Myers/James 'filter' theory of consciousness, as well as with the latest
findings in many branches of physics and psychology, The Myers/James filter
theory says that the human being is made of two aspects; a psyche that interacts
with the body/brain, The brain does not produce consciousness/mind, but it is an
organ that influences, shapes, constrains, enhances and otherwise 'colours'
consciousness in various sorts of ways (p. xxx, p. 73, pp. 603-43). This view,
argues Kelly, explains 'rogue' information and can accommodate quantum
mechanics. Although dualistic, the authors of IMreject Cartesian dualism because
the concept of matter is so problematic: 'Matter as we customarily experience it
does not exist, at least not in the way we naively believe it to exist' (p.
631). So while there is some sense in which consciousness and body are
different, the difference must not be understood in conventional philosophical
terms or in terms of ordinary experience. Just as this filter view is
reconcilable with quantum mechanics, Kelly argues it is not at odds with the
brain-sciences because the self exists in an intimate relationship with the
body; just as a parasite is influence by the host, so is the self influenced by
the body (p. 624). This is a poor analogy because a parasiteoften dies when
separated from the host, but Kelly wants to say consciousness can exist without
the body. Whatever the case, the filter theory allows for changes in the brain's
chemistry to impact the psyche. Only adding to the author's aspiration for a
truly interdisciplinary and integrative approach to the study of consciousness
is their willingness to involve 'religion' and 'science' what we think will
ultimately prove most helpful in catalyzing further theoretical progress will be
thoroughgoing application-determined and disciplined, but also sympathetic and
flexible-of Western-style scientific imagination to the to the phenomenological
realities revealed by the great contemplative traditions, both East and West. We
need to chart more fully and accurately the natural history of these 'higher' or
'deeper' subliminal realms' (p. 638). For someone such as myself who studies
Hindu views mind, body and consciousness, these are refreshing statements
indeed.
Despite its clarity, IM does tend to lapse into
unnecessary polemic; too much ink was spilt bemoaning dogmatic materialists who
simply will not take an unbiased view of paranormal science. Although one can
sympathize, I found myself skipping long passages that kept repeating the same
message in different words. Perhaps the space could have been devoted to
garnering support from those who are neither fanatically materialistic nor fully
involved in the study of non-conventional subjects like reincarnation,
mysticism, etc.Some questions not answered in 1M: What causes the intimate
relationship between the consciousness and body? What makes the linkage strong,
or in some cases, weak? Why, if what they say is true, do I exist within this
body rather than some other body? Nor is it clear (and the authors do recognize
this problem), 'which aspects of 'cognitive unconscious' go with the brain,
which with the associated [disembodied] psyche, and how their respective
contributions get coordinated' (p. 629). The solid philosophical and empirical
foundations laid in 1M provide an excellent basis on which to further approach
an answer to these questions.
Dr. Jonathan Edelmann is a
Junior Research Fellow at Harris Manchester College, Oxford
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